It’s this combination of differential impact and relatively
low cost that makes international disputes over
geoengineering almost inevitable. Even if there is broad
consensus that geoengineering is too risky, research
into environmental modification will happen simply out
of self-preservation—nobody wants to fall behind.
Moreover, it’s not hard to imagine some international
actors seeing geoengineering as something other than
solely a way of avoiding environmental disaster.
environment as weapon It wouldn’t be the first time states looked at the
environment as a weapon. In the early 1970s, the
Pentagon’s Project Popeye attempted to use cloud
seeding to increase the strength of monsoons and
bog down the Ho Chi Minh Trail. In 1996, a group of
Air Force and Army officers working with a theory
=weather as force multipler=.The Air Force 2025
program produced a document =owing the weather
in 2025=and a similar project was launched by the
Soviet Union as well.But it got nowhere,there remains
the story.The idea of a geoengineering arms race may
superficially parallel this line of thinking,
it’s actually a very different concept. Unlike “weather
warfare,” geoengineering would be subtle and long term,
more a strategic project than a tactical weapon; moreover,
unlike weather control, we know it can work, since we’ve
been unintentionally changing the climate for decades.
The offensive use of geoengineering could take a variety
of forms. Overproductive algae blooms can actually sterilize
large stretches of ocean over time, effectively destroying
fisheries and local ecosystems. Sulfur dioxide carries
health risks when it cycles out of the stratosphere. One
proposal would pull cooler water from the deep oceans to
the surface in an explicit attempt to shift the trajectories
of hurricanes. Some actors might even deploy counter
-geoengineering projects to slow or alter the effects of
other efforts.
The subtle, long-term aspects of geoengineering could
make it appealing. Because the overt purpose of
geoengineering would be to fight global warming, and
because complex climate systems would make it hard
to definitively blame a given project for harmful outcomes
elsewhere, offensive uses would likely be hard to detect
with certainty. And, in a world where nuclear deterrence
remains strong but the value of conventional military force
has come under question, states will look for alternative,
unexpected ways of boosting their strategic power relative
to competitors.
thinking the unthinkable
Despite the global impact of geoengineering, the differential
climate patterns and the resilience of local technological,
economic, and social infrastructures guarantees that some
states will fare better than others.Much as Cold War nuclear
strategists could argue about “winning” a nuclear war by
having more survivors, advocates of a Global Warming War
might see the United States, Western Europe, or Russia
as better able to “ride out” climate disruption and
manipulation than, say, China or the countries of the Middle
East. It’s a new version of “thinking the unthinkable.”
Smart policies could lessen these risks. The 1977
Environmental Modification Convention, produced by
the United Nations in response to Project Popeye,
prohibits the use of engineered weather or
environmental changes for military purposes;
signatory countries may wish to look at ways of
monitoring and enforcing this treaty. Outright
banning of geoengineering research is highly unlikely,
as it offers a last-ditch hope for staving off climate
disaster. Instead, putting research into the hands of
transparent, international bodies could reduce the
temptation to “weaponize” geoengineering;
internationalization could also help to spread the
liability and costs, reducing one potential source of tension.
The best strategy to avoid the possible offensive use
of geoengineering techniques, however, is twofold:
First, embrace the social, economic, and technological
changes necessary to avoid climate disaster before it’s
too late; and second, expand the global environmental
sensor and satellite networks allowing us to monitor
ecosystem changes—and manipulation. This strategy
may not reduce the temptation to look at geoengineering
as an offensive capacity, but it would ensure that
experiments and prototype efforts couldn’t readily
be hidden under the cover of fighting climate change.
We know all too well that the international contest for
power will continue even in the face of a growing global
threat. It would be a tragedy if, in seeking to avoid
environmental catastrophe, we inadvertently enabled
a new quest for geopolitical advantage. The risks of
turning the Earth itself into a weapon are far too great.
(Jamais Cascio is an environmental futurist and a fellow
at the Institute for Ethics and Emerging Technologies.
He blogs at Open the Future.)(end)
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